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Book Reviews
SHALL WE AMEm THE FIm- AivmNDumNT? By Lewis Mayers. Harper
& Bros., New York, 1959. 241 pp. $5.00.
This book is no dramatic literary masterpiece; nor will it afford
a pleasant evening's reading. But it does contain an understandable
contribution to American thinking about an important and controversial problem. It is a detailed examination of the right to silence
from a practical and philosophical perspective. The author considers the privilege in all settings: (1) the accused at preliminary
hearing, at grand jury investigation, and at the trial; (2) the witness
before the grand jury, before various judicial proceedings, and in
legislative inquiries; and the special problems (3) of the suspect in
the hands of the police and (4) of persons who have breached their
duty as holders of positions of trust. In short the author essays to
answer a need. He observes that, despite a vast accumulation of
judicial and juristic discussion, a citizen seeking light can find no
comprehensive, non-technical examination of the present day operation of the privilege in the varied situations in which it is encountered.1
The book's subtitle reflects the basic line of inquiry: "Is the right
to refuse to testify an obstruction to law enforcement or an indispensable guarantee of liberty?" The author looks hard at the historical
and modem support for the privilege in each of its applications. He
questions whether there is any danger of abuse and coercion when a
witness is legally compelled to testify in orderly public proceedings
with planned safeguards. He examines the practical uses and abuses
of the privilege in refusals to testify when the potential information
will implicate others but could not be used subsequently to prosecute the witness. He points out that secret coercive methods are not
hindered by the sanction of the privilege and would not be aided by
its absence. Extensive journeys into the historical and modem bases
for the rule are made throughout the book.
One of the better attributes of the book is its fund of bibliographical materials; and despite its critical appraisal of the rule, frequent reference is made to contrary authority and reasoning. Another
significant contribution is the attempt to meet every observed defect

1 Mayers, Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment? (1959), hereinafter cited
as Mayers.
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with a practical suggestion for improvement. Furthermore the author's
suggestions seem, for the most part, the result of painstaking investigation.
On the other hand, the book is not free from criticism. The writing,
though non-technical, is stiff and tedious. Repetition of phrases and
ideas is not infrequent. In places the proof-reading appears hurried.
However, the form of the book presents fewer objections than
its substance. Modem arguments supporting the privilege rest primarily upon two grounds: (1) it is a symbol and a safeguard of free
man's right to privacy, and (2) it protects innocent men from unjust
prosecution. An abundance of eminent authority may be found advancing these arguments favoring the Fifth Amendment. Samples of
authoritative opinion would include such men as Dean Wigmore,
2
Dean Griswold, Professor Chafee, Judge Frank, and Justice Douglas.
Mr. Mayers strongly attacks both of the arguments listed above. We
shall examine his arguments in some detail. As a preface to such
consideration, however, two general observations should be made.
First, in seeking to prove the right to silence does not protect the
innocent, Mr. Mayers centers his attack toward Dean Griswold and
Professor Chafee. Each of these men present hypothetical fact situations to illustrate their argument. Mr. Mayers challenges these
hypothetical cases as if the value of the privilege must stand or fall
with these assumed situations. He rebuts these cases by assuming
further hypothetical facts which could point to a different conclusion. This approach is subject to the criticism that such cases are
given only for the purpose of illustration and that Mr. Mayers' hypothetical rebuttal can easily be met by a hypothetical surrebuttal.
Secondly, Mr. Mayers considers, in a disturbingly terse manner,
the modem philosophical basis for the privilege as a symbol of the
right to privacy. The reviewer cannot escape the feeling that the
author is sometimes so engrossed with the details of practical law
enforcement as to miss the larger social implications of the privilege. In the chapter entitled "The Grand Jury Witness," the author
questions, "Does the Privilege Protect the Innocent?" After citing
several cases, Wigmore and Griswold, he states: "Nevertheless, if
the privilege in criminal proceedings is to be defended today, it
presumably must be on the ground that it protects the innocent; and
that it does so has repeatedly been asserted by court and commenta2 Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955); Chafee, The Blessings of
Liberty (1956); Douglas, The Right of the People (1958). See also Mr. Justice

Douglas dissent in Ullman v. United States. 350 U.S. 422 (1956) and Judge
Frank's opinions in United States v. Gruenwald, 233 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1956) and
St. Pierre v. United States, 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942).
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tor.... Singularly lacking, however, has been any convincing demonstration of this proposition." 3 Following this statement are Mr.
Mayers' arguments which are designed to show that the privilege
protects the guilty but does not shield the innocent. The most repeated argument is since no actual case has ever been shown where
an innocent man was protected by the privilege, none exists. In considering the non-availability of such cases, he says:
If an implicated witness before the grand jury who has pleaded the
privilege is not thereafter indicted, it does not follow that he was
innocent. If he is indicted and is thereafter acquitted, it still does
not follow that he was innocent.... To state the problem is to establish the near impossibility of solving it. We must conclude that the

proposition that the privilege protects the innocent witness before
been established but that it is in
the grand jury not only has not
4
effect impossible to establish it.

To the reviewer it seems necessary to distinguish between the
impossibility of producing a recorded case when the privilege conclusively protected an innocent man and the possibility of producing a hypothetical set of facts "establishing" the proposition. The
difficulty of proving factually that innocent men are protected by
their right to refuse to testify hardly establishes the contra conclusion of Mr. Mayers that the privilege does not protect innocent men,
but does shield the guilty.
The author seeks to prove his position by stating that experienced
prosecutors agree that a witness with a clear conscience almost never
invokes the privilege and that an innocent witness will almost surely
be indicted if he refuses to testify. These arguments are the basis of
Mr. Mayers' attack upon the hypothetical situations advanced by
Dean Griswold and Professor Chafee.
Dean Griswold says: "Consider, for example, the case of a man
who has killed another in self-defense, or by accident, without design or fault. He has committed no crime, yet his answer to the ques5
tion whether he killed the man may well incriminate him."
Author's attack:
One is not subpoenaed out of a clear sky to appear before a grand
jury and asked whether he killed some person unknown to him.
He is asked the question presumably because there is evidence
tending to connect him with the violent death under investigation....
If he keeps silent, the likelihood in the ordinary case is that the
independent evidence against him, combined with his refusal to
explain, will move the grand jury to indict him; but if he explains
the circumstances fully, and his explanation is consistent with the
3

Mayers 61.

4 Id.at 64.

5Griswold, op. cit. supra note 2, at 19 (as quoted in Mayers 64).
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other evidence before the jury, the prosecutor will be likely6 to
advise the grand jury against an indictment. [Emphasis added.]

If we must, as Mr. Mayers asserts, presume that evidence connecting
the witness with the death warrants bringing him before the grand
jury, is it realistic to conclude he can explain away the suspicious
circumstances at this point? Certainly his refusal to answer may cast
more suspicion upon him, but is it not probable that his admission
of the act of killing, combined with the evidence produced by the
prosecutor, will force his indictment? If he can explain away the
suspicion of the prosecutor, would it not have been more feasible
to have done so during the police investigation prior to the summoning of the grand jury? If it was not feasible to answer prior to examination in the grand jury proceeding, wouldn't an answer here simply
furnish more damaging evidence and informative leads which would
solidify the prosecution's case? These questions do not lay waste to
Mr. Mayers' arguments, but simply question the value of his attempt to destroy Dean Griswold's hypothetical.
The author next attacks an illustration by Professor Chafee where:
Jones has been killed by a pistol found close to his body. Smith is
called as a witness before the Grand Jury. He is innocent, but he
was near the scene of the shooting at the time and was bitterly hostile
to Jones because of a lost lawsuit. Smith is unpopular in the community and has been in several respects an undesirable citizen.
Moreover, unknown to anybody, he had taken the pistol from a
neighbor's house to shoot skunks the evening before the crime and
returned it unseen the next morning. The case against Smith will
be very black if he discloses that he has possession of the pistol when
'Do you know anything about this gun?' He invokes the
he is asked
7
privilege.

Mr. Mayers indicates that the invocation of the privilege may
make the case "look blacker than if he had given an honest account
of his skunk-shooting safari. His invocation is bound to set the prosecutor hot on his trail, with unpredictable results, and to make the
grand jury more inclined to indict."8 Despite the arguments of Mr.
Mayers, we still must ask how much "independent evidence" the
prosecutor can acquire, and whether an admission of such incriminating circumstances could fail to be more damaging than silence.
One remains unconvinced that the privilege never protects innocent
men.

Aside from considering the validity of Mr. Mayers' attack on
these particular hypothetical cases, there are a few general observations which should be made. It is normally a person connected with
6 Mayers 62, 63.
7 Chafee, op. cit. supra note 2, at 186 (as quoted in Mayers 64).
8 Mayers 64.
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law enforcement who calls for an actual instance where the privilege afforded protection to an innocent person, and who vigorously
demands the withdrawal of the privilege. Such a person, however,
may find himself in a dilemma when he tries to prove that the
privilege protects the guilty but not the innocent. Innocent persons
do not always possess convincing explanations. If, as Mr. Mayers
assumes, the most plausible lies of the guilty will not be persuasive,
will the true testimony of the innocent inevitable be more persuasive?
The author states, "As things now stand, of two lawbreakers committing identical offences, one may go to jail because the evidence
against him is sufficient without the aid of his own interrogation,
whereas the other, who could be convicted were it possible to interrogate him, escapes scot free. If this a civilized result?"' The reviewer
sees no reason why the same conclusion should not apply to two
innocent men charged With identical offenses. The privilege of silence
may save one from conviction. If this is true, the question is not the
simple "either-or" proposition of Mr. Mayers' sub-title: "Is the right
to refuse to testify an obstruction to law enforcement or an indispensable guarantee of liberty?" The real question becomes, is it a
"civilized result" to provide a right which may protect some innocent
suspects and some guilty suspects? Historically, we have believed
it better that a hundred guilty go free than to convict one innocent
man. Perhaps this sacrifice in efficiency is no longer justified, but
isn't this the real question? Is it not evading the question to argue
that the right to silence never benefits innocent men?
In chapter eleven, the author considers the philosophical bases
for the privilege. Here he denounces the argument that the privilege is a symbol of the individual's rights of privacy and liberty
from the collective force of the state. In the brief thirteen pages devoted to this aspect of the privilege, one sometimes gets the feeling
he is reading the statements of a "practical" man who is impatient
with the "theorists" whom he considers on such an abstract plane
as to be divorced from reality. As presented by the author the philosophical bases for the privilege are the right to privacy and the social
contract.
The Right to Privacy
The earliest statement which the author considers here is a passage from a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field that:
[T]he proud sense of personal independence which is the basis of
the most valued qualities of a free citizen is sustained and culti9 Id. at 168.
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vated by the consciousness that there are limits which even the
State cannot pass in tearing open the secrets of his bosom.' 0

Two later articulations of the same idea from the pen of Judge Jerome
Frank are also presented:
[E.] The totalitarian regimes scornfully reject that right. They regard privacy as an offense against the state. Their goal is utter depersonalization. They seek to convert all that is private into the
totally public, to wipe out all unique 'private worlds,' leaving a
'public world' only, a la Orwell's terrifying book, 1948 [sic]. They
boast of the resultant greater efficiency in obtaining all the evidence
in criminal prosecutions. 11 [2.] They [speaking of the Fourth Amendment as well as the Fifth] express the high value our democracy puts
on the right to privacy.... At any such right of privacy, be it noted,
the despotic rulers of totalitarian regimes sneer. They denounce all
privacy, since it blocks efficient enforcement of criminal laws. Their
position, which logically renders asinine any privilege not to testify,
necessarily justifies them logically in subjecting their subjects to
constant spying and snooping, for such despotic surveillance plainly
aids in the detection of those who violate the laws. Our democratic
concern with privacy, they call characteristic of our decadent culture. Before we accept their criticism and sacrifice all our other
values to effective law enforcement, we should reflect on the brutal
consequences of the2 totalitarians' alleged efficiency in pursuing
suspected criminals.1

The Social Contract
The author gives a somewhat lengthy excerpt from Abe Fortas'
article' 3 for this basis of the privilege. In summary, his position is
that the individual is a sovereign entity who deals with the state,
another sovereign entity; that the seventeenth century social compact
basis of government forever renounced absolute power in governments; that governments are instruments of the people whom they
serve; that:
A sovereign state has the right to defend itself, and within the
limits of accepted procedure, to punish infractions of the rules that
govern its relationships with its sovereign individuals. But it has no
right to compel the sovereign individual to surrender or impair his
right of self defense ....14

Mr. Mayers" Attack
In reference to both bases, the author points to our free neighbor,
Canada, which virtually abolished the privilege nearly seventy yeais
10 Mr. Justice Field's dissent in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896),
as quoted in Mayers 160.
11 United States v. Gruenwald, 238 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Gir. 1956), as
quoted in Mayers 161.
12 United States v. Gordon, 236 F.2d 916, 920 (2d Cir. 1956), as quoted in
Mayers 165.
:3Fortas, "The Fifth Amendment: Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum," 25
Cleveland Bar Ass'n J. 91, 98-100 (1954).
14 Ibid., as quoted in Mayers 165.
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ago. But in this context it is relevant to note that Canada has a complete immunity statute which prevents such testimony from being
used in any later prosecution-a situation entirely consistent with the
social compact argument, though it may be inconsistent with our
ideas about the right to privacy. But the question of whether the
need for a right to privacy in the United States justifies such a privilege must be decided by the conditions here, not the conditions in
Canada, a country with a different political and social setting.
The second argument of Mr. Mayers is that our government ruthlessly invades our citizens' privacy in many other contexts, and that:
Had Judge Frank issued a plea for greater respect on the part of
the law for personal privacy in general, one might well sympathize,

perhaps agree; but when he selects as the particular area of privacy
entitled to special, nay, constitutional, protection, the right to keep
concealed from the authorities the evidence of one's illegal activities,
few will feel deeply stirred.15
One might point out that as shown in one of Mr. Mayers' own excerpts Judge Frank was considering something broader than the right
to silence; that is, the Fourth Amendment's guarantee that one's home
shall be safe from invasion unless the invaders are accompanied by
a search warrant issued upon probable cause from an officer of the
court. It is quite possible that had Judge Frank been writing a general essay, rather than a judicial opinion concerned with the questions of law before him, he would have issued a general plea for more
privacy from government in America. But if not, we see no reason for
Mr. Mayers discarding an argument, whose possible validity he
admits, just because Judge Frank failed to enunciate it. Certainly
there are eminent voices making the plea, and surely the author
cannot contend that wrongful, but legal, governmental invasion of
privacy in other areas justifies invasion here.
We suspect the real foundation for Mr. Mayers' strong belief can
be found in his examples where the privilege has been abused, and
consequent to the abuse, substantial areas of collective, unlawful conduct go unchecked. He points out that the privilege is being abused
in various settings, some of which apparently have serious consequences to society. In the reviewer's opinion, this involves the
real question confronting us as Americans. Is the price too high?
Of how much value is the privilege in practice, and as a symbol,
in its present extended state? What is the cost to our society from
its deterrent effect on law enforcement? Mr. Mayers' book does
point out enough instances of abuse to raise doubts, and serious
ones, in the minds of most of us. Despite the reviewer's critical
15 Mayers 162-63.
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approach, the book raises problems which should not, indeed cannot, be ignored by thinking Americans. If it is justifiable to allow
a health inspector to search without a warrant homes suspected of
harboring rats, as held in the Frank case,16 it may be time to examine
carefully how beneficial the right to silence is to intelligent, organized criminal groups, and how threatening these criminal groups are
to our country. Perhaps the privilege is an enshrined constitutional
myth which is used to undermine the very freedom that it was designed to protect. However, it would seem that such an established
principle deserves at least a presumption of its validity-a presumption rebuttable only by facts produced from a scientifically objective

investigation. The arguments advanced by Mr. Mayers seem insufficient to meet this requirement.

A partial solution might be

afforded by having a congressional subcommittee tackle the problem
of gathering large scale factual data.
In termination, the reviewer would like to present one of Mr.
Mayers' last forays with Dean Griswold:
Dean Griswold also summons to his aid the words of Justice Field,
already quoted: '"The essential and inherent cruelty of compelling
a man to expose his own guilt is obvious to every one and needs no
illustration." Yet the essential and inherent cruelty of the procedure
does not prevent its use in every department of life except the law.
Suppose that evidence were laid before Dean Griswold warranting
the suspicion that one of his students, called upon to submit an essay
to satisfy the requirements of the faculty, had employed another
person to prepare the essay and had submitted it as his own. Would
the Dean regard it as an essential and inherent cruelty [sic] to demand of the student that he explain away the evidence? Would not
the dean regard the student's refusal to offer an explanation as of
ground for his expulsion from the school-a fearful
itself sufficient
17
penalty.

The analogy is inaccurate. Alleged criminal conduct punishable
by the state is not the same as conduct in private affairs among per16 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).

sons and institutions. Yet, it could well be that the spirit of the privilege should be weighed for application in private affairs. In making
such a determination, one must remember there are weighty differences between public and private sanctions and public and private
resources for investigation. If, after such determination, the privilege is found inapplicable in private affairs, one still observes that
the student in Mr. Mayers' example is under no legal compulsion
to answer. He simply bears the risk of added suspicion because of
the refusal, much like the silent witness in legal proceedings.
G. W. Shadoan
17 Mayers 168.

